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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
-vs-

Case No. 900452

DOROTHY D'ASTON, etal.,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The questions presented for review are set forth in Appellee's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

OPINIONS OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Two opinions were issued by the Utah Court of Appeals.

The first

dealt with the refusal of the appellant to submit to the process of the
district court and is cited as D'Aston v. D'Aston. 790 P.2d 590 OJt. Ct.
App. 1990") and contained in appellant's appendix exhibit "A".

The

second opinion dealt with the merits of the appeal and is cited as
D'Aston v. D'Aston. 794 P.2d 500 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) and contained in
appellant's appendix exhibit "B".

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION

The date of entry of the decision sought to be reviewed by
appellee is June 14, 1990. The date of entry of the Order Denying
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing is August 30, 1990.
for a writ of certiorari has been filed.

No cross-petition

The statutory provision which

confers jurisdiction on the Utah Supreme Court to review the decision in
question is Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(a¥supp. 1990).

CONTROLLING STATUTES

Appellant is not aware of any controlling provisions of
constitutions, statutes, ordinances, or regulations.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In this case, appellant, Dorothy D'Aston (Dorothy) and appellee,
Bruno DfAston (Bruno) were married in September, 1953, and continued
their state of matrimony for over thirty-five (35) years.
In 1973, Bruno proposed a written property settlement
agreement to Dorothy which was executed by both parties, notarized,
and duly recorded in the State of California.
Under the 1973 agreement, Dorothy received two parcels of real
estate and cash in excess of $500,000.00.

Bruno received gold, silver,

bullion, exotic cars, patents, and foreign real estate in excess of
$1,100,000.00.
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In addition, the agreement provided that the parties would
execute documents to implement the agreement, and that they had each
read the agreement, been advised by counsel, and were not under
duress, fraud, or undue influence.
On May 2, 1986, Bruno filed this action for divorce and asserted
that Dorothy's property should be divided with him, and further
asserted, that part of his property had been stolen.
On July 21, 1986, Sidney Troxell, Bruno's California attorney, who
had actually prepared the 1973 agreement, sent a letter to coin dealers
advising that Bruno's coins, with a value in excess of $1,000,000.00, had
been stolen.
On July 31, 1986, Sidney Troxell sent a letter to Dorothy's attorney
which stated that the 1973 agreement was in full force and effect.
On August 21, 1986, Bruno assigned his rights under the 1973
agreement to Sidney Troxell.
On August 25, 1986, Sidney Troxell sent a letter to Dorothy
asserting his claim to all property awarded to Bruno under the 1973
agreement.
On September 5, 1986, Sidney Troxell filed a lawsuit in California
against Dorothy, in his own behalf, and asserted that she had stolen
$1,500,000.00 in coins, gold, and silver from Bruno which was his
separate property under the 1973 agreement.
At trial, however, Bruno claimed that the 1973 agreement was
invalid, that he had no assets, that Dorothy or their son, Eric, had stolen
his property, and that he should be awarded one-half of Dorothy's
property.

By contrast, Dorothy testified that all property had been
transferred in 1973 according to the agreement.

She produced detailed

original documents and original checks for each asset owned by her
after 1973.
Bruno produced virtually no original documents, claiming that
they had been stolen, but instead produced handwritten list after list of
highly detailed inventories of coins, gold, and silver that he claimed
were owned by him over a period of thirty-five (35) years.
Bruno testified that he had engaged in highly profitable buying,
selling, and trading of coins, gold, silver and exotic cars during the
period of 1974 through 1986, but admitted that he had filed no income
tax returns since 1974. He was convicted of a felony in 1973. He did
not produce a financial declaration as required by the Rules of Practice
in the 4th District Court setting forth his assets, income, and debts.
The District Court ruled that the 1973 property settlement
agreement was invalid and that Dorothy's property should be divided
with Bruno.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION

Trial was held on April 18-21, 1988, before the district court,
sitting without a jury.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce were
entered on December 15, 1988 (p. 467-538, Record on Appeal).
Dorothy filed a Motion to Amend or Grant a New Trial which was
denied by the district court on January 12, 1989 (p. 562-563, R.).
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Dorothy filed her Notice of Appeal on January 23, 1989 (p. 579580, R.).
During the pendancy of the appeal, the district court found
Dorothy in contempt for failing to comply with certain provisions of the
Decree of Divorce and for failing to submit to the process of the District
Court (see Appendix Exhibit "C").
By its opinion dated April 9, 1989, the court of appeals stayed the
appeal and allowed Dorothy 30 days to submit to process of the district
court (D'Aston v. D'Aston. 790 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1990) (D'Aston D
(see Appendix Exhibit "A").
Dorothy complied with the order of the court of appeals and gave
notice of her appearance to the court of appeals on May 7, 1990 (see
Appendix Exhibit "D").
The court of appeals accepted Dorothy's compliance with its order,
addressed the merits of her appeal, and by its decision dated June 14,
1990, reversed and remanded ( P i s t o n v. D'Aston. 794 P.2d 500 (Utah
App. 1990) ( P i s t o n ID (see Appendix Exhibit "B").
The trial court entered its order regarding contempt on May 22,
1990, and continued the time for considering the matter until October
26, 1990 (see Appendix Exhibit "C").
Upon further consideration of the matter on October 26, 1990, the
trial court found that Dorothy did not have the ability to comply with
the order of May 22, 1990, ordered her committed to jail for five days
with said commitment being suspended upon the payment of a fine in
the sum of $250.00 (see Appendix Exhibit "E").
Dorothy paid the fine on November 15, 1990 (see Appendix
Exhibit "F").

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, and Defendant, Dorothy D'Aston,

were married September 22, 1953, in New York City, New York (page
1402 line 9-12, Record on Appeal).
2.

Bruno was 29 years of age and Dorothy was 21 when they

were married (p. 1768 line 2, p. 1622 line 15, R.).
3.

At the time of the marriage, Dorothy testified that Bruno

had $5,000.00 cash and a 1952 Oldsmobile (p. 1402 linel8-23, R.).
4.

At the time of the marriage, Bruno testified that he had

patents, stamps, coins, silver and gold worth $567,700.00 (p. 686 line
21 - p.687 line 14, R. and Exhibit 8).
5.

During the marriage, Bruno became a multi-millionaire by

his work at Aston Laboratories and by buying, selling and trading coins,
silver, gold, and exotic cars (p. 599 line 17 - p. 600 line 8, R.).
6.

During the marriage, Bruno applied for and received many

patents, which he valued at not less than $100,000.00 (p. 825 line 23
p. 826 line 6, p. 830 line 9-24, R. and Exhibit 35).
7.

On March 1, 1973, Bruno presented a property settlement

agreement to Dorothy for her consideration, which had been prepared
by Sidney Troxell, Bruno's attorney in California (p. 833 line 21 - p. 834
line 10, p. 1413 line 8 - p. 1414 line 14, R. and Exhibit 37).
8.

At the time of executing the 1973 property settlement

agreement, the parties owned a home in Los Angeles and real estate in
the City of Industry, California (p. 838 line 1-3, p. 1414 line 15-19, R.
and Exhibit 37).
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17.

By contrast, Bruno claimed to have retired in 1974, that he

earned no income from 1974 through 1986, and that he had filed no tax
returns (p. 831 line 22 - p. 832 line 15, p. 600 line 9-18, R.).
18.

Furthermore, Bruno claimed to have no records because

they were stolen.

He initially claimed that one four-drawer file cabinet

contained all of his records, but later claimed that he had 12 filing
cabinets containing his records (p. 1809 line 6 - p. 1810 line 20, R.)
19.

On April 30, 1986, Dorothy told Bruno to leave, that she

could not put up with his lies anymore, and that the marriage was
finished (p. 1667 line 7 - p. 1668 line 6, R.).
20.

After April 30, 1986, Bruno went to stay with his friend,

Ray Coleman, a retired Provo policeman (p. 1181 line 14-23 and p. 1887
line 22-25, R.).
21.

On May 2, 1986, Bruno filed a Complaint for Divorce (p. 1-4,

22.

On May 20 and 21, 1986, some twenty (20) days after the

R.).

alleged incident of April 30, 1986, Bruno had Officer Phillips and Officer
Scott prepare police incident reports (p. 1230 line 21-23, p. 1568 line
25 - p. 1569 line 1-5, R.).
23.

On July 21, 1986, Sidney Troxell, Bruno's California attorney,

who had actually prepared the 1973 property settlement agreement,
sent a letter to coin dealers advising that Bruno's coins, with a value in
excess of $1,000,000.00 had been stolen (p. 1914, R.).
24.

On July 31, 1986, Sidney Troxell sent a letter to Dorothy

which stated that the 1973 agreement was in full force and effect
(Exhibit 41).
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33.

On November 17, 1988, the district court ruled the 1973

agreement invalid, ordered no alimony, and divided Dorothy's property
with Bruno (p. 440-453, R.).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Appellant complied with the orders of both the court of appeals
and the trial court.
The decision of DfAston II is in harmony with well established
principles of contract law and with prior decisions of the Utah Court of
Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court.
Appellant's bare allegation of theft does not constitute a unique
and compelling circumstance which would justify distributing the
separate property of his spouse.
Appellee's complaint that the court of appeals misinterpreted the
agreement is merely an attempt to introduce new theories or re-argue
old theories which were rejected at trial and not appealed.

ARGUMENT

I.

APPELLANT COMPLIED WITH THE ORDERS OF BOTH THE COURT OF

APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT.

The function for a Petition for Writ of Certiorari is to present to
the court issues which are special and important, and which therefore
require review by the supreme court.
Appellate Procedure provides in part:
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imposed a fine of $250.00 which she has paid (see Appendix Exhibit
"F").
Accordingly, Bruno's request for review of Question 2 is without
merit and should be denied.

Both the court of appeals and the trial

court have been satisfied with respect to this issue.

II.

THE DECISION OF D'ASTON II IS IN HARMONY WITH WELL

ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW AND WITH PRIOR
DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SUPREME COURT.
Bruno argues that DfAston II conflicts with prior decisions of the
court of appeals and of this court.

This is simply not the case.

P i s t o n II adopts the following propositions:
1.
In Utah, prenuptial agreements are
enforceable as long as there is no fraud, coercion,
or material nondisclosure (Huck v. Huck. 734
P.2d 417. 419 (Utah 1986)) (Berman v. Berman.
749 P.2d 127L 1273 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988)).

2.
Other jurisdictions review postnuptial
property agreements under the same standards
as those applied to prenuptial agreements (In re
Estate of Harber. 449 P.2d 7. 16 (1969)
(Arizona)): (In re Estate of Lewin. 595 P.2d 1055.
1057 (1979) (Colorado)): (In re Estate of
Loughmiller. 692 P.2d 156. 162 (1981) (Kansas)):
(In re Estate of Gab. 364 N.W.2d 924. 925-26
(1985) (South Dakota)): and (Button v. Button.
388 N.W.2d 546. 550-51 (1986)(Wisconsin)).
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... , postnuptial agreements are
enforceable absent fraud, coercion, 01 material
nondisclosure (Huck v. Huck. et al. supra p. 12:
In re Estate of Harber, et ah, supra p.. 1.2).

General contract principles appU A : I _
interpreting prenuptial and postnupna 1
agreements (Berman v. Berman supra p. 12'
(Matlock v. Matlock. 576 P.2d 629, 633 (1978))
(Roberts v. Roberts. 381 So.2d 1333. 1335
(1980)) (Bosone v. Bosone. 768 P.2d 1022.. , . 25 (1989))

5
In construing a contract, use Lourt wiii hrst
look to the four corners of the agreement t.
determine the parties intentions (Nielsen v.
Nielsen, 780 P2£ 1264, 1,167 (Ut. Ct, App.
1989)).

6,
Resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties'"1
intent is permissible only if the contract
document appears to express the parties'
agreement incompletely, or if it is ambiguous in
expressing that agreement ( 1 1 ielsen v. Nielsei i.„
supra p. 13) (Anderson v, Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4
(Utah 1982)).

7
rhe determination of vi hether a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law (Buehner Block
Company, 752 P.2d 895) and (Whitehouse v.
Whitehouse, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 28. 30 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1990)).

1 ^

All of the above propositions are well-reasoned rules of law.
Bruno argues that these principles conflict with the case of
Coleman v. Coleman. 743 P.2d 782 (1987). However, the facts of
Coleman do not apply to this case, nor does the reasoning.
In the instant case, the 1973 agreement was executed, notarized,
recorded, deeds exchanged, and property valued at over $1,100,000.00
transferred to Bruno, and real estate and cash valued at over
$500,000.00 transferred to Dorothy.

Thirteen (13) years passed before

Bruno filed for divorce and claimed the agreement was not binding.
There is a difference between a long-standing marital contract and a
proposed stipulation that is submitted for approval and inclusion in a
divorce decree, as set forth in Coleman.
The "compelling circumstances" language found in the case of
Foulger v. Foulger. 626 P.2d 412. 414 (Utah 19811 may also be easily
distinguished.

The Foulger case dealt with the standard to be used

when reviewing a petition for modification of a divorce decree, and in
particular, modifying provisions of a divorce decree dealing with the
disposition of real property.

By contrast, D'Aston II deals specifically

with the enforceability of a postnuptial agreement.

Accordingly,

D'Aston II is properly governed by well established principles of
contract law and is not in conflict with prior decisions of the court of
appeals and this court.
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A UNIQUE AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY
DISTRIBUTING THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF HIS SPOUSE.
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had even proven >?».n .* ihefi occurred, let alone who was supposed to
have committed the offense.
Bi i mo c ontinues to argue his version of l he I acts without
acknowledging that, after presenting four (4) days worth of evidence,

the trial court was not persuaded that Dorothy was involved in any
way.
Finally, Bruno argues that some of the disputed coins were later
found in the possession of his son, Eric. Any reference to Case No.
900223-CA (Appellee's Appendix Exhibit I) is irrelevant and improper
in this court.

Dorothy was not a party to the dispute between Bruno

and his son, Eric, nor was she represented by counsel in that case.

IV.

APPELLEES COMPLAINT THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS

MISINTERPRETED THE AGREEMENT IS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO
INTRODUCE NEW THEORIES OR RE-ARGUE OLD THEORIES WHICH WERE
REJECTED AT TRIAL AND NOT APPEALED.

Appellee argues that the court of appeals misinterpreted the
agreement.

This complaint does not form the basis of review under

Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Bruno argues again

that he should be able to reopen the issue of an alleged theft in order to
defeat the clear language of the 1973 agreement and the specific
instructions of the court of appeals.

This, the court should decline to

allow.
Bruno introduces a new theory of his case by suggesting that it
would be acceptable to him if the court determined that the properties
were separate and then proceeded to divide Dorothy*s separate
property with him.

This is an irrational attempt to acknowledge what

cannot be denied (the validity of the 1973 agreement) and yet convey
some or all of Dorothy's property to Bruno under a theory of equity.
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Appellee's complaint that the court of appeals misinterpreted the
agreement is merely an attempt to introduce new theories or re-argue
old theories which were rejected at trial and not appealed.
Appellant respectfully urges this court to deny the Appellee's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
DATED this 23rd day of November, 1990.
Respectfully

submitted,

\x~ c £
Brian C. Harrison '
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief in Opposition to S. Rex Lewis and Leslie W. Slaugh, 120
East 300 North, P.O. Box 778, Provo, UT

84603, postage prepaid, this

27th day of November, 1990.

Brian C. Harrison
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[5] Further, in viewing all the facts in
the light most favorable to Brinkerhoff, we
can find no prejudice. Harris v. Utah
Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 222-23 (Utah
1983); Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 868 (Utah 1981).
Brinkerhoff neither below nor on appeal
articulates how he was prejudiced by DLS's
failure to notify him in the notice of hearing that the hearing was going to be informal. It seems clear that no prejudice
would ordinarily occur when an informal
hearing is held under the UAPA because
the litigant has an absolute right to a trial
de novo before the district court. In this
trial de novo, Brinkerhoff was able to
present his entire case before a new tribunal for an independent decision. Based
upon the foregoing, we find the trial court
erred in revoking the order of suspension
on the basis that the notice of hearing sent
by DLS did not state whether the administrative hearing was to be formal or informal as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-3(2)(a)(v) (1989).
REASONS FOR THE DECISION
UNDER SECTION 63-46b-5
Brinkerhoff also alleges that DLS violated Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(i) (1989)
by failing to set forth specific reasons for
its suspension of his driving privileges.
This statute states, in pertinent part, that
<4
[w]ithin a reasonable time after the close
of an informal adjudicative proceeding, the
presiding officer shall issue a signed order
in writing that states the following: . . . (ii)
the reasons for the decision."
[6] We dispose of this issue on similar
groundSo First, Brinkerhoff failed to raise
an objection so as to allow DLS to cure any
defect, and second, Brinkerhoff does not
claim, let alone demonstrate, that he was
prejudiced by any alleged error.
The record below shows that Brinkerhoff
made no request of DLS to provide him
with more specific reasons for the suspension of his license. As stated above, a
failure to object to an error and allow a
tribunal to correct its error precludes an
appellant from asserting the issue on apan opportunity to order a continuance to reme-

peal Loyez i\ Schwendimany 720 P.2d
778, 781 (Utah 1986); Condas v. Condas,
618 P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980).
Finally, Brinkerhoff does not allege, and
cannot show, prejudice because, under the
statutory scheme, he was allowed a trial de
novo after which the trial court has the
responsibility to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law justifying its decision.
In summary, the trial de novo cured any
technical procedural errors occurring at the
informal DLS hearing. The purpose of allowing an agency to choose an informal
hearing procedure would be defeated if
technical, non-prejudicial, procedural errors
were sufficient to overturn the agency action. The statutory trial de novo is the
proper remedy to cure these non-prejudicial
errors.
We find that Brinkerhoff failed to object
and preserve his alleged errors. Furthermore, we hold that the trial de novo in the
district court provided by the UAPA eliminated any prejudice to defendant. We
therefore reverse and remand for entry of
an order to reinstate DLS's suspension of
Brinkerhoff s driving privileges.
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ.f concur.
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Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.

Dorothy D'ASTON, et al„ Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 390050-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 9, 1990.
Divorce action was brought. The
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd
dy any problem with notice.
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L. ParK, J., entered judgment, and wife
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings,
J., held that: (1) service on wife's attorney
of order to show cause why wife should not
be held in contempt was sufficient where
wife secreted herself to prevent service of
order, and (2) wife would be given 30 days
to bring herself within process of trial
court, and if she failed to do so, her appeal
would be dismissed.
Ordered accordingly.
1. Divorce <3=>269(8)
Service on wife's attorney of order to
show cause why wife should not be held in
contempt in divorce proceedings was sufficient where wife initially had been served
with process in case and appeared by counsel in matter but subsequently secreted
herself to prevent service of order to show
cause.
2. Divorce <3=>278
Wife, who had secreted herself and
refused to submit to process of district
court in divorce action, would have 30 days
to bring herself within process of trial
court if she wished to appeal divorce judgment: however, if wife persisted in secreting herself in violation of trial court orders,
her appeal would be subject to dismissal.
Brian C. Harrison (argued), Provo, for
defendants-appellants.
S. Rex Lewis (argued), Leslie W. Slaugh,
Howard. Lewis & Peterson, Provo, for
plaintiff-appellee.
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston, filed an appeal from a divorce decree entered by the
trial court on December 15, 1988. Appellee, Bruno D'Aston ("Mr. D'Aston"), filed a
Motion to Dismiss appellant's appeal on the
grounds that she was currently in contempt of the trial court's order and had
secreted herself, refusing to submit to the

process of the district court. He thus argues that appellant shouid not be allowed
to seek a review of the divorce decree on
the merits. We agree with Mr. D'Aston
and therefore stay this appeal and allow
appellant 30 days from the date of the
issuance of this opinion to submit to the
process of the trial court and to give this
court notice of her actions. If appellant
complies with this court's order and gives
this court written verification of her compliance within the 30-day period, then we
will consider her appeal on the merits.
However, if appellant fails to submit to the
process of the trial court within the 30-day
period, the motion to dismiss her appeal
will be granted.
FACTS
We only discuss the facts relevant to this
order, not the underlying dispute.
At the time of trial, appellant testified
that she had $300,000 in cash in a safe
deposit box in Far West Bank and $75,000
in cash in a safe at home. In the divorce
decree, the trial court ordered appellant to
pay Mr. D'Aston $236,300 "from the $300,000.00 in the safe deposit box." To date,
appellant has failed to comply with that
order.
The trial court issued a writ of execution
directing the constable to execute on the
safe deposit box at Far West Bank. The
constable discovered that no such safe deposit box under appellant's name existed,
nor did she have any substantial assets at
Far West Bank.
Mr. D'Aston, on January 11, 1989, filed a
Motion to Compel Compliance with Decree
of the Court. On January 23, 1989. appellant filed a Motion for Stay and Approval
of Supersedeas Bond. The trial court ordered a stay and set the amount of the
supersedeas bond, which was to be posted
within 30 days. Appellant failed to post a
supersedeas bond.
Mr. D'Aston, on March 17, 1989, obtained
an Order to Show Cause directing appellant
to appear and show cause why she should
not be held in contempt for her failure to
pay Mr. D'Aston the $236,800 ordered in
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the decree or to post a supersedeas bond.
The process server could not find appellant
in order to serve the Order to Show Cause.
However, her counsel was served with a
copy of the Order to Show Cause.

without authority to hold her in contempt.
Appellant thus contends this court may not
dismiss her appeal for failure to comply
with the trial court's orders.

On March 22, 1989, the trial court held a
hearing on Mr. D'Aston's Motion to Compel
Compliance. Appellant's counsel was in
court that day and the judge requested his
appearance at the hearing. Appellant's
counsel stated he was making a special
appearance as he had not been given proper notice of the hearing.

[1] Utah courts have acknowledged the
importance of actual notice in contempt
proceedings. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d
118, 378 P.2d 519, 520 (1963); see generally
Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162, 117172 (Utah 1988). However, whether a court
can issue a civil order of contempt without
personal service where a party purposefully hides to prevent service of the order has
not been addressed to date in Utah. Nonetheless, we are in accord with other jurisdictions which have held that where a party
initially has been served with process in a
case, and has appeared by counsel in the
matter, service of an order to show cause
why the party should not be held in contempt on the party's attorney is sufficient.
See Kottemann v. Kottemann, 150 Cal.
App.2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 52 (1957); Brewer
v. Brewer, 206 Ga. 93, 55 S.E.2d 593, 594
(1949); State ex rel. Brubaker v. Pritchard, 236 Ind. 222. 138 N.E.2d 233, 236
(1956); Cap low v. Eighth Judicial Dist
Court 72 New 265. 302 P.2d 755, 756
(1956); Macdermid i\ Macdermid, 116 Vt.
237, 73 A.2d 315, 31S (1950); see generally
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice to, or
service upon, contemnor's attorney in
civil contempt proceedings, 60 A.L.R.2d
1244 (1958).

On April 7, 1989, the court held an order
to show cause hearing. Neither appellant
nor her counsel was present In a minute
entry, the court noted that the March 22,
1989, hearing had been continued to April
7, 1989, and that appellant's counsel had
been informed of this fact at the March 22,
1989, hearing. In addition, the record reflects that appellant's counsel was served
with the Order to Show Cause which listed
the April 7, 1989, hearing date.
On April 13, 1989, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law holding
appellant in contempt of court because she
was purposefully hiding herself from the
jurisdiction of the Court and from service,"
and issued an order of commitment and
bench warrant. The court amended its order of commitment on May 26, 1989. Appellant again evaded service. Appellant's
counsel however, was served with the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the
order of commitment.

In response to Mr. D'Aston's motion to
dismiss her appeal, appellant argues that
since she has not been served with the
Order to Show Cause, the trial court was

In Kottemann, which is factually similar
to this case, the plaintiff had left his residence and thus could not be served with a
motion for contempt. 310 P.2d at 50. The
plaintiffs attorneys were served with the
motion. Id. at 50-51. The attorneys then
asserted they did not know the whereabouts of their client and only had authority to represent him in the appeal. Id. at
r
\. The court rejected the attorneys' attempts to limit their authority and concluded that the service of the order to show
cause upon the attorneys was proper. Id.
at 52.l

1. Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to hold
that no formal adjudication of contempt is necessary in order to dismiss the appeal for failure

to comply with a trial court's order. See Tobin
v. Casaus. 123 Cal.ADp.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795
(1954) (party could not be found for service of

Thereafter, appellant's counsel made a
Motion to Strike Findings of Fact, Order of
Commitment and Bench Warrant. He asserts that he does not know where appellant is and that his current representation
is now limited to this appeal. That motion
was denied.
NOTICE
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The trial court found that appellant was
secreting herself to avoid service of process in this matter. Appellant's counsel
was served with notice of the Motion to
Compel Compliance, the Order to Show
Cause regarding contempt, and the court's
findings of contempt. Appellant's counsel
appeared at the March 22, 1989, hearing on
the Motion to Compel Compliance and was
given notice of the Order to Show Cause
hearing. Because appellant has purposefully hidden to avoid service of process and
notice of the contempt proceedings and the
court's order was given to appellant's attorney, we find the trial court's order of
contempt was properly entered.

[2] Likewise, Utah's appellate courts
have not considered whether they may dismiss a civil appeal when the appellant is in
contempt of a trial court order in the same
action. However, in the area of criminal
appeals, the Utah Supreme Court has dismissed the appeal of a prisoner after he
escaped custody. State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d
703, 704 (Utah 1985); see also Hardy v.
Morris. 636 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1981)
(court dismissed an escapee's appeal from a
dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus). In
Tuttle. the Utah Supreme Court refined its
position in Hardy. The court held that an
appellant prisoner's escape is not an abandonment of his right to appeal and that the
dismissal of his appeal is not an appropriate punishment for his escape. Tuttle, 713
P.2d at 704-05. The court stressed the
fundamental right to appellate review of a
criminal conviction when reinstating the appeal after the prisoner was returned to
custody. Id. at 705.

(1957) (failure to pay alimony and attorney
fees); Michael v. Michael. 253 N.E.2d 261,
263 (Ind.1969) (appellant took child in violation of custody order and fled jurisdiction);
In re Morrell 174 Ohio St. 427. 189 N.E.2d
873, 874 (Ohio 1963) (appellant took child in
violation of custody order and could not be
found); Huskey v. Huskey, 284 S.C. 504,
327 S.E.2d 359, 360 (Ct.App.1985) (party
left jurisdiction to avoid arrest). Other
courts have allowed the party time to comply with the trial court's order before dismissing the appeal. Stewart v. Stewart,
91 Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962) (30
days to comply); Tobin v. Casaus, 128
Cal.App.2d 588,"275 P.2d 792, 795 (1954) (30
days to comply); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 191 Conn. 309, 464 A.2d 771, 774
(1983) (30 days to comply); Pasin v. Pasin,
517 So.2d 742, 742 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987)
(15 days to comply); In re Marriage of
Marks, 96 Ill.App.3d 360, 51 Ill.Dec. 626,
629, 420 N.E.2d 1184. 1187 (1981) (30 days
to comply); Henderson v. Henderson, 329
Mass. 257, 107 N.E.2d 773, 774 (1952) (30
days to comply); Prevenas v. Prevenas,
193 Neb. 399, 227 N.W.2d 29, 30 (1975) (20
days to comply); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 114 R.I. 718, 339 A.2d 247, 250 (1975)
(30 days to comply); Strange v. Strange,
464 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex.Civ.App.1970) (per
curiam) (10 days to comply); Pike v. Pike,
24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d 401, 404 (1946)
(10 days to comply). These courts justify
the dismissal of the appeals on the ground
that it violates the principles of justice to
allow a party who flaunts the orders of the
courts to seek judicial assistance. See, e.g.,
Stewart. 372 P.2d at TOO; Rude, 314 P.2d
at 230; Greenwood. 464 A.2d at 773;
Strange, 464 S.W.2d at 219.

Appellate courts from other jurisdictions
have dismissed the civil appeals of contumacious parties without allowing the parties an opportunity to bring themselves
into compliance with the trial court's order.
Rude v. Rude, 153 Cal.App.2d 2.o, 314
P.2d 226, 230 (1957) (failure to pay support
and attorney fees); Kottemann v. Kottemann, 150 Cal.App.2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 53

Still another approach is to stay the appeal until the appellant has submitted to
the process of the trial court. This approach gives the trial court the flexibility
to fashion the terms under which the noncomplying party may purge its contempt
rather than necessarily ordering the enforcement of the judgment. In Closset v.
Closset, 71 New SO? 2S0 P.2d 290, 291

process;; Pike v. Pike. 24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d
401, 404 (1946) (party secreted herself and her

children to avoid custodv order and service of
process).

CONTEMPT
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(1955), the appellant had failed to comply
with a trial court order in a divorce proceeding and had been found in contempt.
The Nevada Supreme Court did not dismiss
his appeal for failure to comply with the
judgment below, but held that the appeal
would be dismissed unless the appellant
within 30 days submitted himself to the
process of the trial court or posted a supersedeas bond. Id. 280 P.2d at 291. The
court stated:
[A]ppellant husband is now a fugitive
from process of the trial court. We shall
not permit him to avail himself of judicial
review while at the same time he places
himself beyond reach of the process of
the trial court in defiance of its attempts
to enforce its judgment

peal on the merits, giving the appellant 15
days to purge its contempt by delivering
the bonds. Id. at 40, 75 S.Ct. at 94. The
United States Supreme Court found no constitutional violation, stating that "[w]hile a
statutory review is important and must be
exercised without discrimination, such a review is not a requirement of due process."
Id. at 43, 75 S.Ct. at 95. The Court
stressed that "[petitioner's appeal was not
dismissed because of petitioner's failure to
satisfy a judgment pending an appeal from
it It was dismissed because of petitioner's
failure to comply with the court's order to
safeguard petitioner's assets from dissipation pending such appeal." Id. at 44, 75
S.Ct. at 96.
We are persuaded that the Closset apWe do but insist that one seeking the proach is most consistent with the Utah
aid of the courts of this state should Supreme Court's Tuttle decision and the
remain throughout the course of such United States Supreme Court's Arnold deproceeding, amenable to all judicial pro- cision. By adopting this approach, we do
cess of the state which may issue in not deny appellant her right to an appeal
under Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5,- but rathconnection with such proceeding.
er
insist she must submit herself to the
Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
jurisdiction
of the trial court and satisfy
The United States Supreme Court conthat
court's
concerns before she may exersidered an appellate court's dismissal of a
cise
that
right
She merely has the oblicivil appeal on the basis that the appellant
was in contempt of the trial court's order in gation to come forward and offer a reasonNational Union of Marine Cooks & Stew- able alternative to the trial court to safeards v. Arnold. 348 U.S. 37, 75 S.Ct. 92, 99 guard her assets from dissipation pending
L.Ed. 46 (1954). The Court was asked to her appeal.
decide whether the Washington Supreme
Appellant was given the opportunity to
Court violated either the equal protection post a supersedeas bond, but has refused.
clause or the due process clause of the She has ignored the orders of the trial
fourteenth amendment when it dismissed court and, apart from obtaining a tempoan appeal from a money judgment as a rary stay which she allowed to lapse for
reasonable measure for safeguarding the want of a bond, she has provided no reacollectibility of that judgment. The appel- sonable alternative to allow the court to
lant had filed a notice of appeal but had insure that her assets are available to satisoffered no supersedeas bond and had obfy the judgment pending appeal. By her
tained no stay of the proceedings. Id. at
actions, appellant is frustrating the admin39, 75 S.Ct. at 93-94. The trial court oristration of justice.
dered the appellant to deliver certain bonds
Appellant has not claimed that she did
in its possession to the court's receiver for
safekeeping pending disposition of the ap- not have the ability to comply with the trial
peal. Id. The appellant refused and was court's order. See Stewart v. Stewart, 91
held in contempt. Id. As a result, the Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962). This
Washington Supreme Court struck the ap- situation is similar to one faced by a Cali2. Utah Const, art VIII, § 5 provides, in pertinent
part: "Except for matters filed originally with
the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an

appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction
over the cause."
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fornia court, where it found it was ''dealing
with a litigant who not only has previously
failed to appear as ordered, but who up to
this very time remains a fugitive from justice. Apparently, he is unwilling to respond to a court order with which he disagrees, but seeks to obtain on appeal" a
more favorable result Tobin v. Caserns,
128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795
(1954).
We therefore hold that appellant has 30
days from the date of the issuance of this
opinion to bring herself within the process
of the trial court. If appellant submits
herself to the trial court, she should be
allowed an opportunity to offer alternatives
to the trial court to protect the judgment.
Appellant may persuade the court it should
hold the disputed judgment amount in trust
until a resolution of this appeal on the
merits. However, if appellant persists in
secreting herself in violation of the trial
court's orders, her appeal will be dismissed
at the expiration of the 30-day period.
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.
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Shelly Bowers; Sherry Bowers: Monica
Henwood. individually and as personal
representative of the Estate of Ramon
Henwood. deceased: Phyllis Henwood:
and Owen Henwood, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation; The State of Utah;
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1 through
100, inclusive. Defendants and Respondents.
No. 890291-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 12, 1990.
Heirs of victims of train-automobile accident brought action against railroad, Department of Transportation and railroad
engineer. The Third District Court, Tooele
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., entered
summary judgment dismissing wrongful
death action. Heirs appealed. The Court
of Appeals, J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, held that: (1) heirs failed to
establish that either engineer or railroad
were negligent and (2) Department, having
given at least some warning or control at
railroad crossing, was governmentally immune in deciding whether to improve
means of warning or control at crossing
because of fiscal effects of decision.
Affirmed.
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion.

Lewis DUNCAN, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of
Patrick Duncan, deceased; Jason E.
Duncan, a minor by and through his
Guardian ad Litem: Alice Duncan; Noreen Duncan; Michael Duncan: Tim
Duncan; Kevin Duncan; Brian Duncan; Michelle Bowers, individually and
as personal representative of the Estate
of Jefrey and Nicole Bowers, deceased:
Judson Bowers; Florence Hanson;

1. Railroads <3=348<1)
Evidence failed to support claim of
heirs of accident victims that there was
negligence in operation of train or entrusting its operation to engineer who was in
charge at time of automobile-train collision.
L Railroads e=>348<2)
Evidence did not support claim of heir?
of accident victims that railroad negligently
maintained railroad right-of-way at cross
ing with street where train-automobile colli
sion occurred: there was nothing to indi
cate what could have made railroad's right

EXfflBIT B

500

Utah

794 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

judgment or order of the circuit court.
They, therefore, reason that this is an exception to the general delegation of appellate jurisdiction over circuit court orders to
the Utah Court of Appeals.
Again, we do not disagree with the defendants' argument in the abstract, but
cannot decipher how the argument helps
them. Defendants still point to no statute
giving the district court jurisdiction over
appeals from the decisions of a magistrate
under Rule 7. In fact, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1989) vests "interlocutory
appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a first
degree or capital felony" in the Utah Court
of Appeals. Certainly the magistrate was
acting as a court of record in a criminal
case when it held the preliminary hearing.
Finally, both defendants make a number
of policy arguments in favor of giving the
district courts jurisdiction over objections
to bindover orders alleging insufficiency of
the evidence. Although some of their contentions have merit,8 such arguments must
be made to the legislature. It is the legislature which is charged with the task of
statutorily delegating appellate jurisdiction
and we cannot modify its decisions because
we believe policy considerations so dictate.
In conclusion, we affirm the orders of
the district courts refusing to exercise jurisdiction.
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff
and Appellee.
v.
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al., Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 890050-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 14, 1990.
Action was brought for divorce. The
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd
L. Park, J., entered decree of divorce, and
wife appealed, challenging property distribution. The Court of Appeals, 790 P.2d
590, ordered wife to submit herself to process of lower court within 30 days or her
appeal would be dismissed. After wife
gave notice of compliance with order, merits of appeal were addressed. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) postnuptial agreement not made in contemplation of divorce was enforceable, absent
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure,
and (2) postnuptial agreement unambiguously provided that it would apply to disposition of spouses' property in event of
divorce.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Husband and Wife c=>30
Prenuptial agreements are enforceable
as long as there is no fraud, coercion, or
material nondisclosure.
2. Husband and Wife <s=30
Postnuptial agreement not in contemplation of divorce is enforceable absent
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure.
3. Husband and Wife <s=>31(2)
Normal rules of contract construction
would be applied in resolving disagreement

been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The
magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law. and an order of dismissal. The
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

8. Defendants correctly claim that because the
decision to allow an interlocutory appeal is discretionary, defendants might be forced to go
through an unnecessary trial if the right to file
an interlocutory appeal of the bindover order is
denied.
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between husband and wife regarding scope
and meaning of postnuptial agreement.
4. Husband and Wife <3=>31(2)
Core principle in construing postnuptial agreement was to look to four corners of agreement to determine parties'
intentions.
5. Appeal and Error <s=>842(8)
Threshold determination of whether
writing is ambiguous, such that court may
resort to extrinsic evidence of parties' intent, is question of law, and thus trial
court's determination is reviewed under
correction-of-error standard, according no
particular deference to trial court
6. Evidence <s=>450(5)
Postnuptial agreement between husband and wife unambiguously provided
that it would apply to disposition of parties'
property in event of divorce and, therefore,
extrinsic evidence regarding spouses' intent in event of divorce should not have
been considered, where postnuptial agreement, entered into in community property
state, provided that spouses' property
would be divided and division would control
for all purposes, and unambiguously and
specifically referred to rebutting presumption that all property acquired during marriage was community property.
7. Divorce <3»249.2
Any equitable power of trial court to
disregard otherwise enforceable postnuptial property settlement agreement and
to distribute separate property of spouses
at divorce had to be justified by unique and
compelling circumstances.
Brian C. Harrison (argued), Harris, Carter & Harrison, Provo, for defendants and
appellants.
S. Rex Lewis (argued), Leslie W. Slaugh,
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, Provo, for
plaintiff and appellee.
OPINION
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
ORME, JJ.

BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston ("Wife"), appeals from a divorce decree entered by the
district court, principally claiming the court
erred in failing to distribute the parties'
property pursuant to a postnuptial agreement.
On appeal, Bruno D'Aston ("Husband")
responded that since Wife was in contempt
of the trial court and was avoiding court
process, this court should not consider her
appeal on the merits. We agreed with
Husband and ordered Wife to submit herself to the process of the trial court within
30 days or we would dismiss her appeal.
See D'Aston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Ct.
App.1990). Wife gave us notice of her
compliance with our order on May 4, 1990,
and therefore we address the merits of her
appeal in this opinion.
We agree with Wife's contention that the
trial court erred in failing to distribute the
parties' property pursuant to their postnuptial agreement and therefore reverse
and remand.
Husband and Wife divorced on December
15, 1988, after a 35-year marriage. In
1973, Husband asked Wife to enter into a
written property agreement, which had
been prepared by his attorney. The agreement was executed by both parties in 1973,
then notarized and recorded in the State of
California in 1975.
Under the 1973 agreement, Wife received
two parcels of real estate and cash. Husband received all real property outside the
United States; personal property in his possession, which included $1 million in coins
and a collection of antique cars; and all
domestic and foreign patents and patent
rights. The agreement also provided that
all property acquired by either party in
his/her own name would be the separate
property of that person. Finally, the
agreement provided that the parties would
execute documents to implement the agreement, and that each had the advice of counsel, had read the agreement, and had not
signed the agreement under duress, fraud
or undue influence. Shortly after the
agreement was signed, the parties con-
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veyed the property as provided in the
agreement.
On May 2, 1986, Husband filed for divorce. Husband claimed that much of the
tangible personal property given to him
under the 1973 agreement had been stolen
on April 30, 1986, the day Wife had asked
him to leave their home. On July 31, 1986,
Husband's California attorney, who had
drafted the 1973 agreement, sent a letter to
Wife's Utah attorney which stated the 1973
agreement was in full force and effect
Both parties at trial acknowledged they
executed the 1973 agreement voluntarily
and did not execute it under duress, fraud
or undue influence. However, at trial,
Husband claimed the 1973 agreement
should not control the disposition of the
parties' property in this divorce action because the agreement was entered into only
to protect the couple's assets from possible
creditors in pending litigation, not to distribute property in the event of divorce.
Wife at trial claimed she had no knowledge
of the alleged pending litigation and assumed the 1973 agreement was to control
for all purposes, including the possibility of
divorce.
1. See Huck v. Huck 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah
1986) ("it should be noted that in general, prenuptial agreements concerning the disposition
of property owned by the parties at the time of
their marriage are valid so long as there is no
fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure");
Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah
Ct.App.1988).
2. See In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 449
P.2d 7, 16 (1969) (en banc) ("[M]arital partners
may in Arizona validly divide their property
presently and prospectively by a post-nuptial
agreement, even without its being incident to a
contemplated separation or divorce," provided it
is fair and equitable and is free from fraud,
coercion or undue influence and that "wife acted with full knowledge of the property involved
and her rights therein."); In re Estate of Lewin,
42 Coio.App. 129, 595 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1979)
("Nuptial agreements, whether executed before
or after the marriage, are enforceable in Colorado [and a] nuptial agreement will be upheld
unless the person attacking it proves fraud, concealment, or failure to disclose material information."). See also In re Estate of Loughmiller,
229 Kan. 584, 629 P.2d 156, 162 (1981) (postnuptial agreements, fairly and understanding^
made, are enforceable); In re Estate of Gab, 364
N.W.2d 924, 925-26 (S.D.1985) (postnuptial

The trial court held the 1973 agreement
was not intended to control in the event of
divorce, and thus, equitably divided all of
the parties' property and awarded no alimony to either party. Wife appeals, claiming
that (1) the trial court erred in dividing the
parties' separate property in this divorce
action contrary to the terms of the 1973
agreement, (2) the trial court erred in denying Wife alimony, and (3) the conduct of
the trial judge constituted judicial bias.
VALIDITY OF POSTNUPTIAL
AGREEMENTS
[1,2] In Utah, prenuptial agreements
are enforceable as long as there is no
fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure.1
Utah's courts have not yet considered the
enforceability of postnuptial agreements
not in contemplation of divorce. However,
other jurisdictions review postnuptial property agreements under the same standards
as those applied to prenuptial agreements.2
We agree with the majority of our neighboring jurisdictions and thus hold that a
postnuptial agreement is enforceable in
Utah absent fraud, coercion, or material
nondisclosure.3
agreement to protect inheritance rights valid if
property fairly disclosed and spouse enters into
freely and for good consideration); Button v.
Button, 131 Wis.2d 34, 388 N.W.2d 546, 550-51
(1986) (postnuptial agreement must meet requirements of fair and reasonable disclosure,
entered into voluntarily and freely, and substantive provisions fair to each spouse). But cf.
Ching v. Ching, 751 P.2d 93, 97 (Haw.Ct.App.
1988) (general rule that property agreements
should be enforced absent fraud or unconscionability applies to prenuptial, but not to postnuptial, agreements).
3. This postnuptial agreement was entered into
in California. Under California law, married
couples may contract to change the separate or
community status of their property. Cai. Civil
Code § 5103 (1990); In re Marriage of Dawley,
17 Cai.3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 328 n. 6, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 3 (1976). Further, married couples may
enter into contracts with each other concerning
their property rights as though unmarried, subject to rules controlling actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other.
Haseltine v. Haseitine, 203 Cal.App.2d 48, 21
Cal.Rptr. 238, 244 (1962); In re Estate of Marsh,
151 Cal.App.2d 356. 311 P.2d 596, 599 (1957).
California law is in harmony with Utah law on
the issue of the enforceability and interpretation
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Neither Husband nor Wife assert that
the 1973 property agreement was entered
into as a result of fraud or coercion nor do
they contend that there was material nondisclosure of the parties' assets. Thus, this
postnuptial agreement should be enforced
pursuant to its terms.
Our conclusion, however, does not resolve this controversy as Husband and
Wife disagree as to the meaning and scope
of the 1973 postnuptial property agreement Wife contends the agreement by its
unambiguous terms applies in the event of
divorce. Husband argues that it was executed merely to protect the parties' property from creditors and was not intended to
control a distribution of the parties' property in the event of divorce. Thus, we must
determine what the parties intended when
they entered into this 1973 agreement
Utah courts have applied general contract principles when interpreting prenuptial agreements. See Berman v. Bermarij
749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah CtApp.1988) (A
prenuptial agreement should be treated
like any other contract "In interpreting
contracts, the principal concern is to determine what the parties intended by what
they said."). This approach is consistent
with other jurisdictions' treatment of postnuptial agreements.4
[3,4] Thus, in order to resolve Husband
and Wife's disagreement as to the scope
and meaning of this postnuptial agreement,
we apply normal rules of contract construction. The core principle is that in construing this contract we first look to the four
corners of the agreement to determine the
parties' intentions. See Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Utah CtApp.
of postnuptial agreements and thus we need not
resolve the issue of which state's law should
apply.
4. See Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d
629, 633 (1978) ("(C]ontracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is
to fix property rights between a husband and
wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out
the intentions of the makers and to uphold such
contracts where they are fairly and understand-

1989); see also Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah
1988); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
[S-7] The relevant provisions of the
1973 agreement denoting its scope and application state, with our emphasis:
1. The husband does transfer, bargain, convey and quitclaim to the wife all
of his right, title and interest, if any
there be, in and to the following:
(a) The real property at 14211 Skyline Drive, Hacienda Heights, California and in and to all buildings, appurtenances and fixtures thereon.
(b) The "real property at 230 South
Ninth Avenue, City of Industry, California, including all buildings, appurtenances and fixtures thereon, and any
and all oil and mineral rights thereto.
(c) Any and all cash in bank accounts located in the State of California.
2. The wife transfers, bargains, conveys and quitclaims to the husband all of
her right, title and interest in and to real
property located outside of the United
States of America, and in and to all personal property in the possession of the
husband, or subject to his control in the
United States, Europe or elsewhere in
the world, and in and to all patents or
patent rights under the laws of the United States, United Kingdom or any commonwealth thereof, Switzerland, Japan
or other countries. The provisions of
this paragraph apply to all property described herein, whether presently owned
ably made, are just and equitable in their provisions, and are not ootained by fraud or overreaching."); Roberts v. Roberts, 381 So.2d 1333,
1335 (Miss. 1980) ('The rules applicable to the
construction of written contracts in general are
to be applied in construing a postnuptial agreement."); Bosone v. Bosone, 53 Wash.App. 614,
768 P.2d 1022. 1024-25 (1989) ("a community
property agreement is a contract, and effect
should be given to the clearly expressed intent
of the parties").
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or in existence or to be acquired or created in the future.

parties did not intend the 1973 agreement
to apply in the event of divorce.

3. Hereafter, and until this agreement is modified in writing attached
hereto, all property, real, personal and
mixed, acquired by either party in his or
her sole name, from whatever source derived and wherever situated, shall be the
sole and separate property of such person, notwithstanding any law, statute
or court decision giving presumptive
effect to the status of marriage; and
such property shall be free of all claims,
demand or liens of the other, direct or
indirect, and however derived.

The threshold determination of whether
a writing is ambiguous is a question of law,
Buehner Block Co., 752 P.2d at 895;
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292,
1293 (Utah 1983); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57, 60-61 (CtApp.1990),
and thus we review a trial court's determination under a correction-of-error standard,
according no particular deference to the
trial court Id.; see also Seashores Inc. v.
Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah CtApp.
1987).

This postnuptial agreement provides that
Husband and Wife's property will be divided and the division will control for all purposes. The agreement was entered into in
a community property state and the contractual language unambiguously and specifically refers to rebutting the presumption that all property acquired during the
marriage is community property.
The trial court did not expressly conclude
that the 1973 property agreement was ambiguous, but nevertheless proceeded to
take extrinsic evidence5 as to the parties'
intentions and, based upon this controverted extrinsic evidence, concluded that the
5. "Resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties'
intent is permissible only if the contract document appears to express the parties' agreement
incompletely or if it is ambiguous in expressing
that agreement." Neilson, 780 P.2d at 1267; see
also Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah
1982) (only when an ambiguity exists which
cannot be reconciled by an objective and reasonable interpretation of the agreement as a
whole should the court resort to evidence beyond the four corners of the agreement).
6. Husband argues on appeal that even if we find
the trial court erred when it found the 1973
agreement was not intended to apply in the
event of a divorce, the error was harmless because of the broad equitable powers trial courts
possess in domestic matters. See Colman v.
Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
However, even if a trial court has the equitable
power to disregard an otherwise enforceable
postnuptial property settlement agreement and
to distribute the separate property of the spouses, the circumstances must be unique and compelling to justify the application of such an

We find this postnuptial agreement unambiguously provides that it will apply to a
disposition of the parties' property in the
event of divorce.6 Thus, we reverse the
trial court's contrary ruling which was
based upon extrinsic evidence as to what
Husband and Wife intended by their 1973
agreement
In summary, we reverse the trial court's
property distribution and remand for enforcement of the 1973 postnuptial property
agreement and then the division of the
remaining property, if any, not controlled
by it Because we reverse and remand the
property division, we also reverse and remand on the issue of alimony. We believe
our decision necessitates the reconsideration of whether either Husband or Wife
exception. The trial court made no findings to
delineate what it found as compelling circumstances to justify such an action and we find
none.
In support of his argument. Husband claims
that Utah courts have distributed premarital,
gift or inheritance property of one spouse to the
other spouse. See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369,
1373 (Utah 1988); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133,
135 (Utah 1987); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d
1144, 1147-48 (Utah Ct.App.1988); Peterson v.
Peterson, 748 P.2d 593. 595-96 (Utah Ct.App.
1988). We find these cases clearly distinguishable as they do not involve an otherwise enforceable prenupuai or postnuptial agreement.
Husband also argues that Utah courts may
refuse to apply property settlement agreements
in a divorce action. See Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d
472, 476 (Utah 1975); Colman v. Colman, 743
P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ci.App.1987). Again, these
cases do not deal with postnuptial property settlement agreements not in contemplation of divorce and are otherwise factuailv distinguishable.
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should receive alimony.7
GARFF and ORME, JJ.f concur.
(O

| KEY *UM«H SYSTEM^

JACOBSEN, MORMN & ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL BOARD
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,
Defendant and Appellant
No. 890468-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 28, 1990.
General contractor brought suit
against high school board for balance due
on a construction contact The Second District Court, Weber County, John F. Wahlquist, J., awarded, inter alia, judgment to
the contractor and denied the board's counterclaim seeking recovery premised on alleged fact that construction "deadlines"
were not met. Board appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Bench, J., held that the board's
appeal was moot due to the board's paying
of judgment and mailing of satisfaction of
judgment to contractor, and fact that appeal did not involve claims separate and
distinct from those involved in satisfaction
of judgment.
Appeal dismissed.
Appeal and Error <s»781(7)
School board's appeal of judgment entered in favor of general contractor on a
construction contract with board was
"moot" due to board's payment of judg7. We need not consider the issue of whether the
trial court was biased against Wife as we have
reversed the trial court's property distribution
on other grounds.

ment and mailing satisfaction of judgment
to contractor for execution which did not
evidence an intent to appeal, where appeal
did not involve a claim separate and distinct
from those involved in satisfaction of judgment, and board's counterclaim seeking recovery for alleged breach of contractor's
duties under contract was not a separate
and distinct controversy.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Edward J. McDonough, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant
Michael Wilkins and Kendall S. Peterson,
Tibbals, Howell, Moxley k Wilkins, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, GARFF, and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff general contractor sued defendant high school board for the balance due
on a construction contract. The district
court awarded judgment to plaintiff and
denied defendant's counterclaim. We dismiss defendant's appeal as moot.
In Juiy 1984, defendant St Joseph High
School Board of Financial Trustees ("high
school") executed a written contract with
plaintiff Jacobsen, Morrin & Robbins Construction Company ("contractor,,)l for construction work on St. Joseph High School
in Ogden, Utah. Two separate projects
were encompassed by the contract—the remodeling of a gymnasium and locker
rooms, and the addition of a classroom and
library.
Using a standard form contract published by the American Institute of Architects,
high school agreed to pay contractor the
total cost of construction plus a five-percent supervision fee. No firm costs were
established in the contract, although "bud1- Mow doing business as Jacobsen-Robbins
Construction Company.
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S. REX LEWIS (1953), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

k:aston-or.lo
Our File No. 17,603

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
DOROTHY D'ASTON,
Defendant.

Civil No. CV 86 1124
Judge Boyd L. Park

The defendant Dorothy D'Aston personally appeared before the Court on the 4th
day of May, 1990, in person and was represented by her counsel, Brian C. Harrison.
Plaintiff appeared in person and by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis & Petersen.
The Court considered its Amended Order of Commitment dated the 26th day of May, 1989,
together with its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated April 13, 1989, and having
heard representations made by defendant's counsel, as well as by the defendant, and the
defendant having previously been found in contempt of an order of this Court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1.

Defendant may purge herself of the contempt order of this Court by

depositing with the Court the sum of 5236,800.00. The defendant is given ^6 days from May
4, 1990 to purge herself of her contempt.
2.

In the event the defendant fails to make the aforesaid deposit, the

defendant is ordered committed to jail for a period of sixty (60) days.
3.

Unless previously modified by an Order of this Court, the Court will review

the Commitment Order on June 22, 1990, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. at which time the
defendant is ordered to appear in person before the Court. The Court will make its review
on that date prior to committing the defendant to jail.
4.

The Bench Warrant previously entered herein on the 13th day of April, 1989

is hereby withdrawn.
DATED this

day of May, 1990.

BY THE COURT

JOYD L. PARK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

day of May, 1990.

Brian C Harrison, Esq.
3325 No. University Avenue
Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
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HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Defendant
3325 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone:
375-9801
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUNO D'ASTON,

}

Plaintiff,

]\

-vs-

]

DOROTHY D'ASTON
Defendant.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

;
])
)

Civil No. CV-86-1124
Judge Boyd L. Park

TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS:
You will hereby take notice that the Defendant, Dorothy
D*Aston, appeared before me on the 4th day of May, 1990 for further
Court proceedings as required by your opinion in Case

Number 890050-CA filed April 9, 1990.
The Defendant is still in contempt of Court, but has been
granted 45 days in which to purge her contempt.

Additional

proceedings have been scheduled for June 22, 1990 to review this
matter.
DATED this

'

day of

"^'h.--

1990.

BY THE COURT:
^
r~? *- '+ /

s

'

'-?-

Honorable Boyd L. Park

APPROVED AS TO FORM^
- ^
'

•

• '

m

...

,...—• •

!<»

r ^

S„ Rex Lewis^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Notice of Compliance on this
1
day of
h-i
, t989, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to
/ W
the following.

S. Rex Lewis
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
The Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Secretary

EXHIBIT E

HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Defendant
3325 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-9801
Utah State Bar #1388

IN TOE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUNO ASTON,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

)
])

ORDER

]

DOROTHY ASTON, et al,
Defendant.

]
)1

Civil No. CV-86-1124

)

Judge Boyd L. Park

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing on the
26th day of October, 1990, Plaintiff being represented by his
attorney, S. Rex Lewis, and the Defendant being present and
represented by her attorneys, Brian C. Harrison and Don Mullen, and
the Court having considered the evidence submitted and the
testimony of the Defendant and argument of counsel, and being fully
advised in the premises;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

On May 22, 1990, this Court entered an order relative to

Defendant's contempt and continued the matter until this date to
further consider this matter.

The Court finds that Defendant does not

have the ability to comply with the order of May 22, 1990, and
modifies said order as follows:
a.

Defendant is ordered committed to jail for a period

of five days with said commitment to be suspended upon the
payment of a fine in the sum of $250.00. Defendant may have 90
days to pay said fine.
2.

The Court is seriously concerned about the doatn threat

LksL made to Defendant's attorney, and reserves
which was apparonfly
MSM

irontiy'

the issue of inquiring into said 4hfeat-ywhen all parties are before the
Court.
DATED this

day of

//0&40~£e£^

Boyd L. Park
District Court Judge
Approved

1990.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Order on this (j&day of /flpfXM+rJbL*.
1990, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following:
S. Rex Lewis
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Secretai
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